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NOTES
AUTOMOBILE SALES AND USE TAXES IN NORTH DAKOTA
The use tax imposed on motor vehicles in North Dakota pro-
duces an unfair competitive advantage in favor of domestic auto-
mobile dealers over out-of-state automobile dealers. It is the
writer's contention that the tax is arbitrary and discriminatory as
well as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce, a power which
is expressly granted to Congress by the United States Constitu-
tion.1
SALES TAX
A sales tax of 2% is imposed on the sale of all motor vehicles
in the state of North Dakota. 2 The sales tax base is determined by
deducting from the sale price any amount allowed for a trade-in,
cash discount, or for any other purpose.
Sales of automobiles directly to purchasers outside of the state,
to be delivered outside the state by the seller, are exempt froth the
provisions of this tax.4
USE TAX
The motor vehicle use or excise tax was first adopted in 1937
under the title "Sales Tax Motor Vehicles"; it imposed an excise
tax of 2% upon every owner of a motor vehicle, for the privilege
of using the streets and highways of this state.' The Use Tax Act
of 1939, which incorporated this tax, is expressly declared to be
supplementary to the retail sales tax laws of this state6 and exempts
motor vehicles upon which a sales tax has been paid.7  Another
exemption or partial exemption, as the case may be, is made when
a vehicle has been subjected to a sales or use tax in another state
in an amount less than 2%; then the provisions of the North Da-
kota use tax shall apply, but only at a rate measured by the dif-
ference between the two rates. If such tax imposed in another
state is 2%,, or more, then no tax shall be due;" however, this credit
shall apply only if such other state allows a tax credit with respect
to the retail sales and use taxes imposed by North Dakota.9
1. U. S. Const. art. , 8 l. 3.
2. N. D. Rev. Code 57-3902 (Supp. 1957) The sales tax was first imposed in
1933 as an emergency rn(,asure and has been reenacted by every subsequent legislative
assembly.
3. N. D. Rev. Code § 57-3.901, subs 6 (1943).
4. N. D. Rev. Code § 57-3903, subs 1 (1943).
5. N. D. Sess. Laws 1937,.c. 167 at 309.
6. N. D. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 241, § 3, subs. 2 at 411.
7. N. D. Rev. Code § 57-40,13 (1943).
8. N. D. Rev. Code 57-4010 (1943).
9. N. D. Rev. Code § 57-4010 (Supp. 1957).
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The use tax base is the purchase price.1 ° The term "purchase
price" is defined as the total amount for which tangible personal
property is sold, valued in money, whether paid in money or other-
wise, but cash discounts allowed and taken on sales shall not be
included.1"
The office of the Attorney General has given its interpretation
of the North Dakota Use Tax Act regarding the tax base. The
material portion of the opinion is as follows:
"... We, therefore, go to subsection 5 of section 57-4001 to
get the definition of 'Purchase Price,' and said term is therein
defined as 'the total amount for which tangible personal prop-
erty is sold, valued in rnoney, whether paid in money or other-
wise, but cash discounts allowed and taken on sales shall not
be included'; appiying the definition of 'purchase price' to the
provisions of section 57-4012, it is our opinion that the use tax
must be paid on the full purchase price of the car, for the rea-
son that the statute reads that said tax must be paid whether
the purchase price was paid in money or otherwise. Otherwise
can be taken to mean a trade-in."
' 2
However, it is the writer's contention that if the words "whether
paid in money or otherwise",1" as used in defining "purchase price"
under the Use Tax Act, re decisive, then the same result would
follow as to the sales tax base. The Sales Tax Act is identical in
defining "gross receipts", i. e., "whether received in money or other-
wise."14
The phrase "whether received in money or otherwise", appears
in both the Sales and Use Tax Acts. In the Sales Tax Act this
phrase is followed by the words: ". . . but discounts for any pur-
poses allowed and taken on sales shall not be included ... "'5 In
the Use Tax Act, this phi ase is followed by the words, ". .. but
cash discounts allowed and taken on sales shall not be includ-
ed .. ."1 It would seem from the foregoing that the only basis
for making a distinction as to the use tax base is that the words
"cash discounts" are used in the Use Tax Act, while the words
"discounts for any purposes" are used in the Sales Tax Act.
OPERA TIONAL EFFECT
The consequence of the use tax is that domestic retail automo-
bile dealers are given an unfair competitive advantage over neigh-
10. N. D. Rev. Code § 57-4002 (Supp. 1957).
11. N. D. Rev. Code k 57-4001, subs. 5 (Supp. 1957).
12. 1948-50 Ops. Att'y Gen. 183 (1949).
13. N. D. Rev. Code * 57-4001, subs. 5 (Supp. 1957).
14. N. D. Rev. Code 57-3901, subs. 6 (Supp. 1957).
15. Ibid.
16. N. D. Rev. Code 57-4001, subs. 5 (Supp. 1957).
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boring foreign competitors. To illustrate the discriminatory effect
of the use tax, the following hypothetical example is offered: John
Smith is a life-time resident of Willison, North Dakota. In 1955,
Mr. Smith purchased a 1955 Ford in Williston for $3,300.00, pay-
ing 2% sales tax amounting to $66.00. In 1957 Mr. Smith decides
to trade his car for a 1957 model Ford. The new car at which
Mr. Smith is looking is! priced at $3,400.00; his old car is valued
at $2,000.00. If Mr. Smith trades in North Dakota, he will pay
a sales tax of 2% on the difference which will amount to $28.00
tax. If Mr. Smith trades out-of-state he will pay a 2% use tax on
the full list price, despite any trade-in which will be 2% of $3,-
400.00 or $68.00 tax, a net difference in tax of $40.00.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The "commerce clause" of the United States Constitution17 does
not expressly forbid state taxation of interstate commerce, but
merely provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce among the several states."' This section of the Consti-
tution, as interpreted, gives Congress the exclusive power to regu-
late commerce between the states.1a Taxation of such commerce,
being a form of regulation, is therefore forbidden to the states if
the effect of the tax is to regulate interstate commerce.
20
Further, it is well established that a state is prohibited, under
the "commerce clause" of the United States Constitution, from plac-
ing a tax on interstate cof.,imerce that causes it to be operated at a
disadvantage, as compared to, or in competition with, intrastate
commerce..2 1 In other words, a state tax which discriminates against
interstate commerce violates constitutional rights..22
The constitutionality of this statute has never been tested in
North Dakota, nor are there reports of a similar discriminatory sit-
uation having existed in any other state.
The practice of levying a use tax or sales tax, based on the sale
price, without allowance for a trade-in, is constitutional so long as
the same tax base is used on purchases within the taxing state,
which are subject to sales tax, as is used on out-of-state purchases,
which are subject to use tax. -2  This practice is in effdet in several
17. U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. See 20 Minn. L. Rev. 466 (1936).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Department of Revcnue v. Jenmisoni-Wright Corp., 393 111. 401; 66 N.E.2d 395
(1946).
22. Ibid.
23. Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
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states including Washington -2 4 and California.2., In other words,




The validity of the use ta- is well settled where the purpose and
effect of the tax is to place the retailer of the taxing state on an
equal footing with retailcrs in other states, as well as to prevent
the revenues of the taxing state from being depleted by the plac-
ing of orders in other states to escape the tax on local sales.27
When employed for this purpose, use taxes are constitutional in so
far as the tax does not constitute a discrimination against inter-
state commerce, but only prevents discrimination against local
sales .21
Tax schemes that have been held discriminatory and, therefore,
unconstitutional, include: A tax which was levied on the gross pro-
ceeds ofa railroad from the transportation of freight from points
within the state to points outside the state and vice versa, hut not
on the gross proceeds from the transportation of freight passing
through the state;2 a $50.00 tax imposed on non-resident commer-
cial fishermen as compared with a $5.00 tax for resident fisher-
men;3" a tax on solicitors of $50.00 and one half of one per centum
of the gross earnings, receipts, or fees or commissions for the pre-
ceding license year in excess of $1,000.00;1 a tax imposed on
wholesale activities of those engaged in interstate commerce, but
not on those who performed the same taxable act, but who manu-
factured, within the state. 2 In determining whether or not a state
tax is discriminatory, the United States Supreme Court has said
that their decision must depend, not on the form of the taxing
scheme alone, but rather on the practical operation and effect of
the tax as applied and enforced.3
The North Dakota Constitution provides that taxes shall be uni-
24. Wash. Rev. Code c. 82.08 and c. 82.12 (1951).
25. Cal. Code Ann. §§ 6003, 6004 (1956).
26. See note 23 supro.
27. fermeford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1936).
28. Herman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191 55 A.2d 491,
493 (1947) (dictum). See Gregg D3.eing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1931).
29. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1886). A Washington statute provided for a
2% tax on all sales of tangible -personal, property within the state based on the selling
price and a complementary tax on purchases made outside of the state. In upholding the
statute, the court said, "What Washington is saying to sellers beyond her borders is in
substance this: you may ship your goods in such amounts and at such prices as you
please, but the goods when used n Washington after the transit is completed, will share
an equal burden with goods that have been purchased here."
30. Mullaney, Comm'r of Taxation of the Ter. of Alaska v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415
(1952).
31. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1945)..
32. Columbia Steel v State, .30 Wash. 2d 658, 192 P.2d 976 (1948).
33. Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1919).
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form upon the same clas of property, including franchises, within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." The taxes
levied under the Use Tax Act, therefore appear to be arbitrary,
non-uniform, illegal, and in contravention of and prohibited by the
North Dakota Constitution..
'LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The question of the intnt of the legislature as to how the use
tax should operate remairs open. The Attorney General of Iowa,
which state North Dakota apparently patterned its sales and Use
Tax Acts after, in one of his opinions said that the use tax is in-
posed as a complement.to the sales tax and is intended to require
the buyer of goods purchased outside the state to pay an amount
equal to the sales tax that he would have paid had he purchased
the goods within the state. ' The Supreme Court of Iowa has held
that the use tax law is supplementary to the sales tax law and
serves, not only to produce revenue, but also to protect dealers
within the state by placing them on tax equality with out-of-state
vendors whose sales are not subject to sales tax."
It is submitted that the legislature be urged to pass appropri-
ate legislation, during the next general assembly, to remedy our
use tax law.
ODELL AsTRup.
INCOME TAX SAVING VIA THE SHORT TERM TRUST
The short-term intervivos trust has become of increasing import-
ance to counteract the present day graduated income tax.' The
trust is doubly advantageous when it can accomplish its ultimate
goals in the form of gifts to one whom the grantor is morally obli-
gated to support, and at the same time split the taxpayer's income
into two or more separately taxable entities2 For example an out-
34. N. D. Const. art XI, § 176.
35. Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. at 556 (1938).
36. Peoples Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 238 Iowa 1369, 28 N.W.2d 799
(1947). See Nelson v. Sears Rloebuck & Co., 312 U ' S. 359 (1941). A New York Cor-
poration, with retail establishments in Iowa, was required by Iowa statute to collect a
tax on orders placed by residents of Iowa at the corporation's office outside the state. The
Iowa statute was upheld, the court saying ". . . The use tax and sales tax are comple-
mentary. Sales made' wholly within Iowa carry the same burden as those mail order
sales. A tax or other burden does not discriminate against interstate commerce where
equality is its theme." "
1. General references include: Murphy, Clifford-Type Trusts and the 1954 Code,
29 N.Y.S. Bull. 55 ('1957); Alexander, A Case Method Restatement of the New Clifford
Regulations, 3 Tax. L.ofilev. 189 (1947).
2. But* one must..use care., See Paster v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.
1957) (A trust transaition within a family group is subjected to special scrutiny so that
what is in reality one economic unit may not be broken up into two or more units);
Edison v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1945) (The grantor is taxable if he
retains in economic substance what lie previously enjoyed)..
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